This paper identifies the determinants of wages and productivity in Mexico over time using national representative linked employer-employee databases from the manufacturing sector. It shows that both employers and employees are benefiting from investments in education, training, work experience, foreign R&D and openness after NAFTA. Additional years of schooling have a higher impact on wages and productivity after NAFTA than before. Endogenous training effects are larger for productivity than for wages, suggesting that the employers share the costs and returns to training. It is also found that investment in human capital magnifies technology-driven productivity gains.
Introduction
Since the introduction of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the dynamics of the Mexican economy have changed substantially. When NAFTA was introduced, manufactured products only accounted for 35 percent of Mexican exports.
Since then, the manufacturing sector has grown to produce close to 90 percent of Mexican exports. However, the annual growth rate of labor productivity in Mexico is low compared to other developing countries (World Bank 1998a). Dar and others (2000) contend that one plausible explanation for the slow growth in labor productivity is that Mexican workers have a lower education level, resulting in the deficiency of human capital accumulation on-the-job as compared to elsewhere. 1 The empirical evidence on the links between human capital (schooling), on the one hand, and productivity and wage growth on the other, is strong. Numerous studies using worker-level data have also shown that more educated and/or trained individuals are also more productive in a rapidly changing environment in which cognitive abilities to process new information are most important, and thus earn higher incomes (Welch, 1970; Mincer, 1989; López-Acevedo and Tan; 2002) . Human capital (education) is viewed not only as an investment but also as a factor of production. Human capital is a stock of skills produced by education and training (Welch 1970 and Mincer 1989) .
Highly educated workers have a comparative advantage with respect to the adjustment and implementation of new technologies. For this reason, the productivity of highlyeducated relative to less-educated workers is greater (Bartel and Lichtenberg 1987 ).
There i s limited, but growing, empirical literature on the link between human capital (training) and firms' performance (Koning 1994; Revenga 1995; Batra and Tan 1995; Barrett and O'Connell 1998; World Bank 1998a , 1998b , 1999 , 2001a , 2001b Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen 2000) . Using panel data, several studies have 1 The increase in wages associated with an additional year of work experience for Mexican men is low compared to the increase for men with similar educational attainment in other countries (3.8 percent in Mexico compared with 8.1 percent in United States, 8.4 percent in Japan, and 9.1 percent in France). This rate is low even when compared with the rate in countries at a similar level of development and with comparable education indicators, such as Brazil (6.2 percent) and Colombia (5.8 percent) .
shown the positive impact of training on productivity (Nielsen and Rosholm 2002; Batra and Tan 1995; Dearden, Reed, and Van Reenen 2000) .
Extensive literature has been compiled in the closely related field of the impact of human capital (training) on workers' wages. A consensus has nearly been made that earnings increase with more training. The increase is in the range of 20 percent in most developing countries (Middleton and others 1993; Dar and others 2000; Nielsen and Rosholm 2001) .
Given the well-documented correlation between wage growth, on-the-job training, and productivity observed in many countries, the observed labor productivity growth rate difference between Mexico and elsewhere i s consistent with the hypothesis that in Mexico post-school investment in human capital results in lower productivity growth.
The observed low level of investment in human capital could also be explained by the incentive structure of labor regulations. In practice, as has been well-documented, firms appear to enjoy more flexibility than a strict interpretation of the law would suggest (World Bank 1999) . This paper analyzes wage and productivity determination in Mexico. This paper differs from previous labor market studies in Mexico in five ways. First, by using linked employer-employee datasets, this paper adds a new dimension to traditional wage analysis. Most wage studies only have detailed information about individual workers; however, this paper has detailed information about both individual workers and the firms.
Second, the impact of employer and employee characteristics on wages and productivity before and after NAFTA is analyzed. Third, to assess the marginal impact of human capital and other cha racteristics on both wages and productivity, joint equations of wage and production functions are estimated. This methodology allows us to compare the impact that each variable has on wages with the impact that it has on productivity. In other words, how the distribution of benefits (in terms of wages and productivity) are shared by workers and firms Fourth, training is treated as an endogenous variable following Nielsen and Rosholm (2002) . And fifth, restricting the sample set to firms of a particular size firm-specific effects are estimated. Studies on wages and productivity in developing countries identify firm size as another significant determinant of wages and productivity (Tan and Batra, 2000) . As noted by Brown and Medoff (1989) , with all other factors being equal, large employers pay more than small employers. One way to explain this wage differential is that larger firms employ higher quality workers because of the greater capital intensity and capital-skill requirements of larger establishments. This paper is organized by first introducing the data. Second, the descriptive statistics are presented. Third, the methodology is described. Fourth, the determinants of wages and productivity are analyzed by first analyzing employee characteristics and then by analyzing firm characteristics. The effects of variables on wages and productivity are compared. The wage and productivity effects of training treated as endogenous are also discussed. The final section offers the conclusions of these findings.
Data
The data used in this paper come from the National Survey of Employment, The wage data was obtained from ENTRAM, as reported by the worker and converted to real 1997 pesos. The productivity per worker measure was calculated from ENESTYC, using INEGI's methodology, that is, the difference between the value of the production of the firm and its expenditure in non-labor inputs in real 1997 pesos, then divided by the total number of workers in the firm.
The information on individual establishments that INEGI gathers through its questionnaires (which firms are required to answer by law) is legally confidential; therefore, we followed an established procedure in which most data analysis was done in INEGI's Aguascalientes headquarters with the support of INEGI personnel.
Nevertheless, the reader should bear in mind the limitations for data analysis imposed by this institutional arrangement.
Descriptive Statistics
The distribution of relevant variables is tabulated, with sampling weights, in Table 1. 3 From this table, it is apparent that the percentage of female employees has increased from 1993 to 1999 by 6 percentage points. Manufacturing firms seem to be most concentrated in Central Mexico. According to the division of activity, basic metallic industries and other manufacturing industries increased their shares by the most -from 3 to 4 percent and from 1 to 5 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the share of the wood and wood products industry decreased the most -from 7 to 4 percent. The percentage of firms with more than 50 percent foreign capital increased from 15 to 19 percent. The percentage of firms that invest in research and development (R&D) diminished from 57 to 33 percent; whereas, the percentage of firms that adopted new technology increased from 71 percent in 1993 to 86 percent in 1999. Small and medium firms decreased from 20 to 18 percent and from 35 to 18 percent, respectively. The share of micro firms tripled. Most significantly, the share of firms that export more than half of their products increased more than three times. having external training all appear to be related to highe r wages in both 1993 and 1999.
Not surprisingly, the reverse was also true in that having no training at all, having no inhouse training, and having no external training, all appear to be related with wages below the average. Concerning productivity, those firms that provided their workers with training were more productive in both 1993 and 1999. Not surprisingly, those firms that did not provide any training were not as productive as the national average. with the exception of in-house training in which the effect was similar for both years. On the other hand, the effect of productivity was greater in 1999 than in 1993 for all types of training. In the following sectio n, the trend described in this section are analyzed formally using a regression framework.
Methodology
First, a general model that contained all relevant explanatory variables was formulated. Second, eliminating statistically insignificant variables one at a time reduces this model to a more concise one. Workers are the unit of observation, and both workers and firm's characteristics are included in the individual vector of variables. The dependent variables are monthly wages and value added-productivity per worker. The equations are estimated jointly (sureg) to make the link between wages and productivity.
Let P be a 2 column matrix containing wages and productivity, Z a matrix of worker's characteristics such as age, years of education, time working for that firm, potential experience, training, gender, union membership, and type of contract. X is a matrix of firm characteristics such as research and development (R & D), new techno logy adoption, ownership, age, export orientation, quality control, firm size, region, and sector of activity. The regression error is ε . The coefficients are the vectors α and β .
Since the independent variables are the same in the system, seemingly unrelated regression equations (sureg) are equivalent to the OLS estimation, equation by equation.
By estimating (1) as a system, there is a gain in efficiency since the disturbances in the wage and productivity equations are contemporaneously correlated. Further, the joint estimation allows us to test for the equality of the coefficients in (1). In order to avoid aggregation biases, equation (1) was also estimated by firm size.
Results
This section discusses the results of the estimation using both wages and value (with sampling weights) was done for all firms, which are the pooled coefficients. Then the estimation was done for every group of firms, classified by size, so that we were able to differentiate the effect by firm size.
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Individual Characteristics of Employees
i. Schooling
Education has been singled out as the most important factor in determining wages and earnings inequality in Mexico. This realization has increased the importance of education over time. Not surprisingly, the results of the wage-productivity equation
indicate that schooling increases wages as can be seen in Table 5 . The coefficients are significantly different from zero in both 1993 and 1999 for all firm sizes.
These findings are not surprising. A worker receives higher wages with more education, conditional on other relevant individual characteristics as well as on characteristics of the firm. In the 1999 findings, an additional year of schooling was shown to yield a 10 percent increase in wages versus the 9 percent found in the 1993
findings. Typical rate of return studies in Mexico show that schooling increases wages by 10 percent (World Bank, 1998a An additional year of schooling yields a 10 percent increase in wages in small, medium and large firms, but only 7 percent in micro firms. However, additional schooling has a greater productivity enhancing effect for workers in micro and small firms. In micro firms, however, the effect of schooling on productivity decreased over time by 2 percentage points.
The results also reveal a positive and statistically significant effect of schooling on productivity in both 1993 and 1999 (an increase from 2 to 4 percent). The positive effect of schooling on productivity in large firms in 1999 is statistically significant compared to 1993.
However, the hypothesis which states that the effect of education on wages and productivity would be the same must be rejected since the difference was greater for wages, meaning that workers' benefits are higher than those of firms. 8 This means that workers have greater benefits than firms from schooling.
7 A potential source of bias could arise in standard rate of returns to schooling studies because most of them do not control for the ability of the individual. Card (2001) uses several instruments to correct this problem. He shows that the coefficient of the schooling variable is even larger after controlling for the endogeneity of schooling. 8 We performed hypothesis tests for the equality of the wage and productivity coefficients. Results are on Appendix C.
ii. Training
The regression results indicate that in-service training accounted for higher wages in 1999 but not in 1993(see Table 6 ). In-house training is positively correlated to productivity in 1993. In 1999, in-house training had a positive and significant effect on wages and productivity in medium size firms. In 1993, only the firms benefited from inhouse training. In 1999, workers who received externa l training earned, on average, 26 percent higher wages (see Table 7 ). This result accounts for a productivity increase of only 14 percent for workers who received external training. Thus, training obtained outside a firm increases productivity. This finding suggests that employees benefit the most from external training with a 26 percent wage premium compared to 5 percent from in-house training. In 1999, we cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients for external training on the wages and productivity estimates, which suggests that both employers and employees are benefiting equally from external training. The wage return of both in-house and external training changed from being negative in 1993 to being positive in 1999, which suggests a growing demand for skills since NAFTA took effect.
Does Mexico under invest in training?
The answer appears to be that it does as indicated by the very high returns to training, which actually serves to show that this type of training is scarce.
The returns to training also vary by firm size and by year. For example, in 1999, external training was positively correlated with workers' wages in micro, medium, and large firms (33, 25, and 25 percent, respectively). One implication of the external training results is that policies that encourage increased training will lead to larger productivity gains for the economy. Gains that firms receive from training and foreign ownership (discussed below) are shared with employees in the form of higher pay.
Are rates of return to training associated with complementary investments in technology? Considering the joint effect of training with technology adoption increases wages, but it simultaneously seems to decrease productivity (Tables 8 and 9 ). A plausible explanation for this is that training only has a positive effect in certain types of technology adoption. For example, the results indicate that combining in-house training with the acquisition of new numerically controlled computerized machinery increases productivity by 44 percent. 
Endogenizing Training
Following Nielsen and Rosholm (2002), we control for selectivity bias of training.
A Treatment Effects Model (Treatreg) was estimated to endogenize the training variable.
Outcome P (wages or productivity) is a function of explanatory variables in Z (workers' characteristics) and X (firms' characteristics). Training (TR), that enters in vector Z in equation (1) is considered as an endogenous variable (our treatment variable).
The binary decision to obtain the treatment TR is modeled as the outcome of an unobserved latent variable which represents the expected present value of returns to training, TR*. It is assumed that TR* is a linear function of the exogenous covariates Q that includes the variables in Z and X and the instruments (marital status of the worker and number of economic dependents of the employee) 10 , and a random component u.
The outcome and training equations can be written as a system of equations:
Where the worker trains according to this rule: 
iii. Potential Experience
The model also includes workers' potential experience, which is defined as age-S-6, where S represents the number of years workers have accumulated in that firm. Both level and squared forms of potential experience were included in the model, which allowed for non-linearities. The results of the analysis were inline with the expected positive effects of potential experience on wages in 1993 and 1999 (see Table 11 ). The positive effect of experience on wages increases at a younger age, and it continues at an older age but at a decreasing rate. In 1999, potential experience has a positive effect on wages and productivity in all firm sizes. However, the hypothesis test indicates that workers benefit more than firms from potential experience.
11 These results are available upon request.
12 Dearden, Reed and Van Reneen (2000) make this argument to explain the tripling of productivity and wage impacts of training when training is endogenized. 
iv. Gender
This paper also examines the effect that gender has on both wages and productivity for various firm sizes. Not surprisingly, female employees were paid less than their male co-workers, but they were also less productive than men in both 1993 and 1999 (see Table 12 ). This finding indicates that the wage gap according to gender is due to productivity differentials. For 1993, the hypothesis test indicates that the productivity gap is much larger than the wage gap. However, in 1999, we cannot reject the hypothesis of the equality of coefficients of gender on the wage and productivity equations. This finding implies that there is no gender discrimination since wage differentials are explained by equal or larger productivity differentials. By using interaction variables, we found some results that were surprising and some that were inline with our hypotheses. The results of the interaction variables show that investment in education of men does not significantly increase men's wages or productivity more than that of women (see Table 13 ). By mixing the variables of training and gender, we found that training generally increases men's wages above that of women's (see Tables 14 and 15 ). In 1993 external training increased men's wages slightly more than in-house training did. In-house training, however, increased men's wages more in 1999 tha n in 1993 in large firms.
External training increased men's wages by a higher percentage in 1999 than in 1993 in small firms. This generally shows a trend that training-especially external trainingincreased men's wages more than women's by a higher percentage over time.
In terms of productivity, training also increased men's productivity more than women's. In 1993 external training increased men's productivity by slightly more than in-house training did in large firms. Productivity in the case of me n's in-house training in large firms in 1999 increased from 2 to 26 percent in just 6 years. Thus, over time training seems to increase productivity of men more than productivity of women, but we cannot make any definite conclusions as to whether productivity increases more with inhouse or external training. 
v. Union Membership
By studying union membership in this analysis, it became apparent that union membership reduces wages in Mexico across all firms. In 1993 and 1999, union members earned lower wages than non-union members (see Table 16 ) by 24 and 28 percent, respectively. This finding is surprising because studies from wage analysis in developed countries usually show that union members earn more than their non-union member colleagues. However, in another World Bank study (1999), it was found that unionization does not increase wages in Mexico.
Despite the decrease in wages that union members face, statistically significant numbers show that union members were more productive than non-members in both 1993 and 1999. The productivity gap is 17 percent in 1999 and 10 percent in 1993.
However, further research is needed to establish whether union members themselves are more productive or if it is the firms they work for that are more productive. In 1993 union members earned lower wages than non-members by 10, 30 and 29 percent less in small, medium, and large firms, respectively. In 1999 the effect of union membership on wages by firm size was increasingly negative.
vi. Type of Contract
Both permanent and temporary worker contracts are examined in order to consider how these two types of contracts affect workers' wages and productivity. The main differences between the workers in these contracts are their employment benefits, the duration of these benefits, and their skills. Employers have been found to be more likely to invest in human capital if they were planning on retaining their employees over the long term. Table 17 shows the estimated wage differentials associated with a worker's type of contract -temporary or permanent. In 1993 permanent workers earned an average of 9 percent lower wages and were 9 percent less productive than temporarily-employed workers. However, the results shifted in 1999, whereby permanent workers earned 3 percent higher wages and were 7 percent more productive than temporary workers.
Furthermore, we cannot reject the test of hypothesis that the wage and productivity coefficients are equal.
Firm Characteristics
i. Research and Development
In 1993 R&D increased both wages and productivity. Wages increased by 2 percent, and productivity increased by 20 percent (see Table 18 ). However, this trend did not continue in 1999 since R&D and productivity were found to be strongly negatively correlated. However, foreign R&D was found to have a positive effect on both wages and productivity, by 19 and 90 percent respectively. ii.
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Ownership and Export Orientation
The following two tables illustrate two important firm characteristics effects on wages and productivity. The two variables that are used are ownership structure and export orientation.
It is presumed that a firm with partial foreign ownership is more likely to be affiliated with international markets tha n a strictly Mexican-owned firm. In both 1993
and 1999, foreign ownership had a positive effect on productivity and wages, controlling for both firm and individual characteristics (see Table 19 ). Firms mostly owned by foreigners are statistically more productive than firms owned by locals, and they pay higher wages. In 1993 mostly foreign-owned firms were 54 percent more productive, and they paid 7 percent more than firms that had little or no foreign ownership. In 1999 mostly foreign owned firms were 28 percent more productive, and they paid 13 percent more than the mostly domestic-owned firms. Furthermore, from 1993 to 1999 the positive correlation of foreign ownership with wages in small, medium, and large firms increased substantially. The hypothesis test indicates that the productivity gap is larger than the wage gap meaning that firms benefit the most from foreign ownership. Surprisingly, the size of export share is associated with lower wages and productivity in 1993 and with lower productivity in 1999 (see Table 20 ). Productivity in 1993 was shown to be negatively correlated with export orientation in all sizes of firms except micro. In 1999 productivity was still negatively correlated with export orientation, although to a lesser degree. iii.
Quality Control
Empirical evidence suggests that a firm's introduction of quality control measures enhances its productivity and exports (see World Bank, 2001 ). Quality control only had a positive correlation with wages in 1999 but not in 1993 (see Table 21 ). Furthermore, productivity was negatively correlated with quality control in 1993.
The correlation of quality control with productivity varies by firm size. For example, the introduction of quality control in 1999 increased productivity in small firms, but it decreased productivity in medium-size firms. Quality control did not have a correlation with productivity in micro or large firms in 1999. However, when comparing statistically significant productivity results for small firms in 1993 and 1999, productivity seems to increase over time. 
iv. Sectors
Industry-specific factors were measured by including dummy variables for each of the nine major manufacturing sectors: (1) food, beverages, and tobacco; (2) textiles, clothing, and leather; (3) wood and wood products; (4) paper and paper products; (5) chemicals, oil derivatives, and coal; (6) non-metallic mineral products; (7) basic metal industries; (8) metal products, machinery, and equipment; and (9) other manufacturing industries.
Controlling for other firm and individual characteristics, the estimations show that in 1993 employees working in sectors other than the food, beverages, and tobacco sector earned around 10 percent more than them, except for the wood and products and the other manufacturing industries (see Table 22 ). However, only basic metal industries showed superior productivity compared to the food sector by 21 percent more. In 1999 workers in all other sectors -other than food, beverages, and tobacco-received higher wages, while only basic metal, chemicals, oil derivatives, and coal demonstrated higher productivity. 
v. Location
The following regions (1) the North, (2) the Center, (3) the South, and (4) Mexico City were considered in terms of their influence on wages and productivity.
In 1993, workers employed in southern firms earned lower wages by an average of 21 percent than those employed in northern firms located near the border with the United States. In 1993, employees in Mexico City earned 6 percent higher wages than northern workers; however, in 1999 this distribution shifted dramatically. Established firms in the central, southern, and Mexico City regions paid lower wages than their northern counterparts by 12; 32; and 10 percent, respectively. The southern regions have always paid the lowest wages. However, the northern region has surpassed Mexico City in terms of the wages it pays. This is possibly due to its proximity to the United States and the favorable conditions that has brought for the region since the initiation of NAFTA (Esquivel et. al. 2002) .
With respect to productivity, firms in Mexico City were 6 percent less productive than northern firms in 1993. In 1999 firms located in the central region were 13 percent more productive than northern firms, while southern firms were 25 percent less productive (Table 23) . Thus, southern firms have shown to not only pay less wages, but they are also less productive. In 1999, micro firms -in the central, southern, and Mexico City regions paid lower wages than northern firms by 29; 43; and 24 percent, respectively. Small firms located in the center and in the south paid 14 and 46 percent, respectively, lower wages than northern firms. Medium-size firms paid 10, 18, and 12 percent (center, south, and Mexico City, respectively) lower wages than those firms located in the north. Finally, large southern firms paid 22 percent lower wages than large northern firms, and large firms in Mexico City paid 11 percent less. Thus, southern firms paid the lowest wages across all sizes of firms compared to all of the other regions, and northern firms paid the most.
With respect to productivity in 1999, the greatest productivity differentials are found in southern micro and medium firms that were 50 and 61 percent, respectively, less productive than northern firms. Small firms in Mexico City were also found to be much less productive than small firms in the northern region (46 percent). In general, southern firms tend to be less productive.
vi. Firm Size
In 1993 productivity in small, medium, and large firms was higher than micro firms by 23, 30 and 27 percent, respectively. This productivity gap among firm sizes increased from 1993 to 1999. In 1999, small, medium, and large firms were more productive than micro firms by 38; 93; and 124 percent, respectively. In 1999 firm size was positively correlated with wages and productivity (see Table 24 ). With respect to wages, large firms paid close to 25 percent more than micro firms in 1999. The correlation of firm size with wages and productivity is positive, but the impact on the latter was shown to be far greater.
Conclusions
Using linked employee-employer manufacturing sector data (the ENTRAM-ENESTYC surveys from 1993 and 1999), this paper examined the micro-determinants of wages and productivity in Mexico. We used two kind of variables, those of the supply side which are the workers' characteristics; and those of the demand side which correspond to the firms' characteristics.
First, the wage premium increased with the years of schooling. Furthermore, we found that the rate of returns to education have not been overstated in traditional wage equations. We might be underestimating the effect of the schooling coefficient in our estimation since we did not control for the endogeneity of this variable. An additional year of schooling in 1999 was shown to yield a 10 percent increase in wages.
Furthermore, additional years of schooling were also shown to increase productivity.
Rates of return to education by firm size increased from 1993 to 1999. The workers have higher benefits from schooling than firms.
Second, both employees and employers benefited the most from external training.
The wage return, from in-house and external training changed from being negative in 1993 to being positive in 1999, but whereas in-house training only increased wages by 4 percent, external training increased wages by 26 percent. External training was not only shown to benefit the workers; employers who utilized external training enjoyed higher levels of productivity as well by an average of 14 percent. Firms were the only ones to benefit from in-house training in 1993, and it seems that employees and employers benefit equally from external training. Both productivity and wage impacts of training are even higher when training is endogeneized.
Third, potential experience was shown to have increased wages in both 1993 and 1999. However, there were decreasing returns to potential experience. Workers benefit more than firms from potential experience.
Fourth, on average women were paid less than men were in both 1993 and 1999, but they were also shown to be less productive than men. Furthermore, investment in men's education did not seem to significantly increase their wages or their productivity to a level above women; however, training did increase men's wages and productivity more than for women. There seems to be no gender discrimination since wage differentials are explained by equal or larger productivity differentials.
Fifth, union membership was shown to decrease wages across all sizes of firms in both 1993 and 1999. Despite this decrease in wages, union members were shown to be more productive than non-union members; however, further research needs to be undertaken to determine whether union members themselves are more productive or if it is the firms they work for that are more productive.
Sixth, in 1993 permanent workers earned less and were less productive than temporary workers; however, these results changed in 1999 as permanent workers earned higher wages and were more productive than temporary workers.
As we have mentioned, we could not only rely on characteristics of the workers while ignoring characteristics of the firms that could very well also influence wages and productivity. For this reason, we chose six firm characteristics to examine in terms of the effect on wages and productivity.
First, R&D was shown to have increased both wages and productivity in 1993.
However, this trend did not continue in 1999 as productivity was shown to be negatively correlated with R&D. Despite all of this, foreign R&D has a strong positive effect on wages and productivity.
Second, foreign ownership proved to have a positive and statistically significant correlation with productivity and wages in both 1993 and 1999. Firms benefit the most from foreign ownership. However, export-oriented firms seemed less productive in 1993
and 1999, and they paid lower wages.
Third, quality control was positively correlated with wages in 1999 but not in 1993. Furthermore, quality control was negatively correlated with productivity in 1993.
Fourth, this paper examines nine major manufacturing industries. Workers in the food, beverages, and tobacco industry were found to earn lower wages than the workers in the other industries; however, workers in these other industries were not much more productive.
Fifth, by comparing four regions of Mexico -north, center, south, and Mexico City -regional wage and productivity gaps were found. In terms of wages, southern firms paid the least. In 1993, firms in Mexico City paid their employees the highest wages, but in 1999 it was the northern firms. In terms of productivity, southern firms were also the least productive. Small southern firms exhibited the worst numbers in terms of their productivity. In 1993 northern firms were the most productive, but the central region surpassed the northern region in terms of productivity in 1999.
Sixth, larger firms were more productive and paid higher wages than the other firms. The correlation of size on wages and productivity is positive, but the impact on productivity is far greater than on wages. Whereas medium-sized firms were shown to be the most productive in 1993, small and large firms were nearly as productive. However, in 1999 large firms became much more productive than medium and small firms. Large firms were the most productive, followed in productivity according to size by medium, small, and then micro firms. Wages also followed the same trend in 1999 in that the large firms paid the highest wages.
Appendix A
The national survey of employment, wages, technology, and training (ENESTYC)
There are two ENESTYC surveys collected by INEGI: one for manufacturing establishments and another for maquila-exporting firms. The unit of observation is the firm.
The universe for the manufacturing survey is the Economic Census updated with the Encuesta Industrial Mensual (EIM) and with information from the petrochemical industry. The maquila survey universe is the Economic Census. The manufacturing universe includes 54 activities and 309,157 establishments. The survey design is random, stratified at national level for each of the 54 activities, and for firm size. The selection is as follows:
1. Stratify establishments in four groups for each activity according to firm size (number of employees). 2. The sample selection is random and independent for each activity stratum. 3. The expansion factor is calculated as the inverse of the probability of selection.
The national survey of workers in the manufacturing sector (ENTRAM)
ENTRAM is also collected by INEGI. The universe is the worker of the establishments interviewed in the ENESTYC. The sampling design is random, bi-staged, and stratified for each of the 9 sub-sectors of the Clasificacion Mexicana de Actividades y Productos (CMAP) 1994 and by firm size. Establishments are selected in the first stage. Manufacturing workers are selected in the second stage. This process is as follows:
1. In each sub-sector, the establishments are stratified in four groups according to firm size (measured by number of workers). 2. In the first stage, a random sample of approximately 10 percent of firms is selected by stratum. 3. In the second stage, based in the payroll of the establishments, a random sample of 10 workers is selected from each firm distributed as follows: a) 1 manager (director) b) 3 employees c) 3 specialized workers d) 3 general workers 4. In the case of micro establishments with ten or less workers, all employees are interviewed. 5. The expansion factor is calculated as the inverse of the probability of selectio n. 
APPENDIX B
